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by Carl E. Schneider 
Alawyer today can hardly speak to a doctor--or even be treated by 
one-without being assailed by 
lawyer jokes. These jokes go well be-
yond good-humored badinage and pass 
the line into venom and gall. They re-
flect, I think, the sense many doctors 
today have that they are embattled and 
endangered, cruelly subject to pervasive 
and perverse controls. 
This is puzzling, almost to the point 
of mystery. Doctors have long been the 
American profession with the greatest 
social prestige, the greatest wealth, and 
the greatest control over its work. In-
deed, what other profession has been as 
all-conquering? One may need to go 
back to the seventeenth-century clergy, 
and before them perhaps to that glori-
ously predominant profession-knight-
hood. This mystery is worth exploring 
because ultimately regulating the pro-
fession is crucial to many of bioethicists' 
hopes. So let us explore it. 
The Physicians' Lament 
"\VJhen you press doctors to explain 
W their distress, you hear that the 
law regulates medicine too closely. And 
you hear most about the law of malprac-
tice. Yet though our malpractice regime 
is far from admirable, doctors are wrong 
in much of their indictment of it. 
Physicians' first charge against the 
law of malpractice is that it imports ex-
ternal criteria to evaluate doctors. This is 
baffling. The law sedulously uses the 
standard of care established by medical 
practice. It does so even though much 
tort law is moving toward strict (that is, 
no-fault) liability for injuries and even 
though the arguments for strict liabil-
ity-including consumer tgnorance, 
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plaintiffs' difficulty in proving fault, the 
desirability of spreading the costs of 
injuries, and strict liability's deterrent 
effect-apply to medical services. 
Second, doctors say juries are pro-
plaintiff, anti-doctor, incompetent, and 
prodigal. Sometimes, perhaps, but plain-
tiffs appear to win malpractice suits only 
one-fifth to one-third of the time.1 Fur-
thermore, one study of 117 malpractice 
cases in North Carolina found that 
while the average award was $367,737, 
the median award was only $36,500. 
The average was inflated by four cases 
with awards ranging from $2.9 million 
to $750,000. Three of those cases in-
volved serious injuries, including (in 
each case) brain damage; in the fourth 
the patient died. (The largest element of 
most awards tends to be the cost of 
medical services incurred because of the 
malpractice.) According to the study, 
jurors "often were suspicious of the 
plaintiff's decision to bring suit and fre-
quently mentioned their concerns about 
the effects of verdicts on insurance rates 
and other social costs of large damage 
awards." They said things like, "We all 
go through hardships in life, ... and we 
won't always be able to blame or get 
what we think we deserve" (p. 121). 
Doctors' third charge against mal-
practice law is that it necessitates "de-
fensive medicine." Physicians do faith-
fully report to the American Medical 
Association that they practice defensive 
medicine. Doctors may indeed overtreat 
some patients. But why? Because of 
malpractice law? Out of an abundance 
of caution? Because the fee-for-service 
system doctors have historically used 
creates a financial incentive to do so? 
Some defensive medicine is probably 
due to the remarkable fact that doctors 
overestimate the annual rate of suit by a 
factor of three, overestimate the risk of 
suit from an incident of negligence by a 
factor of almost five, and overestimate 
the risk of suit from an adverse event by 
a factor of eleven.2 But we can fairly ask 
that doctors not respond irrationally to 
malpractice law, that doctors have a re-
alistic sense of the chances of being sued. 
Paul Weiler, one of the ablest stu-
dents of medical malpractice, observes 
that evidence of "defensive medicine" 
would in other contexts "be viewed as a 
positive compliment to the law," since it 
looks like evidence that the law deters 
negligence. He concludes that "[m]al-
practice law has played a valuable role in 
stimulating broad-based improvements 
in the institutional environment and 
procedures through which medical care 
is provided .... "3 
In sum, the standard elements of 
doctors' attacks on the law of malprac-
tice seem strangely insubstantial. And 
the profession's animus toward that law 
is yet more striking when one grasps 
how responsive the law has been to 
doctors' discontents. For example, when 
doctors complained (with scant reason) 
that they risked being sued by accident 
victims they had stopped to assist, legis-
latures obligingly passed "Good Samar-
itan" statutes. (Happily, studies suggest 
that these laws do not affect doctors' 
willingness to help the injured in emer-
gencies.) 
Similarly, the malpractice "crisis" of 
recent years illustrated just how eagerly 
the law can defer to medicine. State leg-
islatures alertly responded to doctors' 
indignation with a deluge of soothing 
statutes that attempted to narrow the 
standard of liability, to cap damage 
awards, and to constrain access to courts 
with devices like limitation periods, 
screening procedures, and limitations 
on attorney fees. 
The medical profession's reaction to 
the law of malpractice would be more 
understandable if the profession had 
demonstrated a livelier interest in find-
ing ways of dealing with incompetent 
doctors and of protecting patients in-
jured by malpractice. But doctors have 
no more to boast of than lawyers in this 
respect. As Weiler observes, 
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[T]here is notorious underreport-
ing of incompetent practice by the 
doctor's professional peers. Even if 
the physicians in charge of a hospi-
tal or clinic observe or learn of the 
danger posed by one of their col-
leagiles, their natural inclination is 
simply to ease the offending doctor 
out of the institution rather than go 
public with complaints to the au-
thorities. (p. 1 08) 
Weiler adds that state medical boards 
"appear disinclined to judge their col-
leagues sufficiently incompetent to lose 
the right to practice entirely" (p. 109). 
And where medicine has shown some 
interest in deterring incompetent care-
for example, in creating risk-manage-
ment and quality-assurance programs-
the profession has not infrequently 
seemed driven by fears of malpractice 
liability. 
Still There Are Problems 
D espite all I have said, the medical-
malpractice system is surely unsat-
isfactory. Its fault, however, is not so 
much that it harasses doctors, but that 
it disserves plaintiffs. First, the system is 
a painfully expensive method of com-
pensating injured patients. Again, Weil-
er: "[T]he malpractice litigation and lia-
bility insurance system forces doctors 
and hospitals to collect $7 billion from 
their patients to deliver $3 billion into 
the hands of a selection of injured pa-
tients" (p. 91). 
Second, far from there being too 
many plaintiffs, there are too few: One 
of the best studies found that only one-
eighth of all potential claims are actual-
ly filed. And "even when we narrowed 
our focus to the more serious and 'valu-
able' tort claims-iatrogenic injuries to 
patients under seventy that produced 
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disabilities (including death) lasting six 
months or more-we still found that 
for every 3 such events there was only 1 
tort payment" (p. 13). 
The mystery, then, is how so success-
ful a profession can feel so enfeebled by 
so misunderstood a threat. Like all large-
scale social mysteries, this one has many 
causes. For example, doctors sometimes 
seem to abandon the scientific method 
when it comes to nonmedical reason-
ing. In the small and insular world of 
medicine, horror stories proliferate. In 
each story may lurk a kernel of truth. 
But soon the story circulates, unaccom-
panied by the facts that might dilute its 
force, like news of settlements or appel-
late court reversals. It gains strength with 
the retelling and soon loses contact with 
its origin. Since the rumor confirms sub-
cultural views, it is widely credited. 
But there are also weightier forces at 
work. Physicians, like most profession-
als (not least lawyers), see the good they 
can do with power and appreciate the 
prerogatives that come with it. As 
Robert Zussman concludes, "Physicians 
are not concerned about specific and 
limited legal obligations. Instead, they 
are concerned with the basis of medical 
discretion. From this perspective, the 
point is not what the law says but the 
simple fact that it says anything at all."4 
Furthermore, while they misdiag-
nose the reasons for it, doctors are in-
deed losing the professional authority 
and autonomy they have come to ex-
pect and enjoy. We live in the age of 
distrust, and like most American social 
institutions, medicine has experienced 
declining cultural power. But this de-
clining cultural power is not just a prod-
uct of the times or even of the market. 
It is also a product of the belief that 
medicine has, like all professions, like all 
institutions, sometimes abused the 
power it has had. This is the lesson of 
Tuskegee, of Willowbrook, of the law of 
informed consent. This is the lesson the 
patients I have interviewed draw from 
their dealings with physicians they too 
often found unskilled and unkind.5 
But this is not the greatest source of 
doctors' loss of power. Medicine is 
changing from a profession of solo prac-
titioners to a profession of bureaucrats. 
More and more doctors work for hospi-
tals, HMOs, or urgent care centers, and 
those who do not are often driven to 
joining preferred provider organizations. 
More and more of their work is invigi-
lated by ever-more inquisitive third-
party payers, like insurance companies, 
Medicare, and Medicaid. Utilization 
management organizations require sec-
ond opinions, discharge planning, high-
cost case management, preservice certi-
fication, and concurrent review. The 
professional autonomy of the individual 
doctor now seems at risk. It may be 
partly to this development that doctors 
are reacting. And not without reasons. 
But it may be more profitable to address 
those reasons directly without being di-
verted by misplaced indignation about 
the law of malpractice. 
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